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Pakistan Ordinance XX Of 1984:
International Implications
On Human Rights
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is probably
the most precious of all human rights, and the imperative need today
is to make it a reality for every single individual regardless of the
religion or belief that he professes, regardless of his status, and re-
gardless of his condition in life. The desire to enjoy this right has
already proved itself to be one of the most potent and contagious
political forces the world has ever known. I
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 26, 1984, under the Martial Law Regime of President
Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan added Ordinance XX 2 to the Pakistan Penal
Code. Ordinance XX is a law which prohibits Ahmadiyya Muslims
3
from publicly practicing their religion.4 Violations of Ordinance XX
1. Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Prac-
tices, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at vii, U.N. Doc. E/3335 (1960).
2. The complete title of this ordinance is the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani
Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984, reprinted
in The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Apr. 26, 1984, § I, at 73 [hereinafter Ordinance
XX].
3. Ahmadiyyas, also known as Quadianis, are followers of Mirza Ghulum Ahmad, who
founded the sect in Quadian, India, in 1901. Hirza Ghulum Ahmad claimed to have received
a revelation from God; hence, those who believe Mirza Ghulum Ahmad do not believe that
Mohammed is the last Prophet, as do the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. PAKISTAN: A COUNTRY
STUDY 124 (R. Nyrop ed. 1984) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY].
4. The body of Ordinance XX reads as follows:
Part I. - PRELIMINARY
1. Short title and commencement -(1) This Ordinance may be called the Anti-
Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition
and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Ordinance to override orders or decisions of courts. The provisions of this
Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any order or decision of any court.
Part II. AMENDMENT OF THE PAKISTAN PENAL CODE
(Act XLV of 1860)
3. Addition of new sections 298B and 298C, Act XLV of 1860. In the Paki-
stan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) in Chapter XV, after section 298A, the following
new sections shall be added, namely: 298B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and ti-
tles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or places. (1) Any person of the
Quadiani group or of the Lahori group (who call themselves "Ahmadis" or by any
other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation,
(a) refers to, or addresses any person, other than a Caliph or companion
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are defined as anti-Islamic activities and criminal offenses, 5 punishable
by imprisonment for up to three years, in addition to a fine. 6 Ordi-
nance XX also provides that "[tihe provisions of this Ordinance shall
have effect notwithstanding any order or decision of any court."
'7
In August of 1984, the United Nations Human Rights Subcom-
mission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minor-
ities (Subcommission) 8 began an investigation 9 to determine whether
of the Holy Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him), as "Ameer-ul-
Mumineen," "Khalifa-tul-Mumineen," "Khalifa-tul-Mustimeen," "Sahaabi" or
"Razi Allah Anho";
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person other than a wife of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) as "Ummul-Mumineen";
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family
(Ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) as "Ahle-
bait"; or
(d) refers to, or names, or calls his place of worship as "Masjid"
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves
"Ahmadis" or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by
visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his
faith as "Azan," or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
298C. Person of Quadiani group, etc. calling himself a Muslim or preaching or
propagating his faith. - Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group
(who call themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly,
poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or
propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or
written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the reli-
gious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Part IV. AMENDMENT OF THE WEST PAKISTAN PRESS AND PUBLICA-
TIONS ORDINANCE, 1963 (W.P. ORDINANCE NO. XXX of 1963)
6. Amendment of section 24, West Pakistan Ordinance No. XXX of 1963. -
In the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 163 (W.P. Ordinance No.
XXX of 1963), in section 24, in subsection (1), after clause (j), the following new
clause shall be inserted, namely:
"(j) are of the nature referred to in section 298A, section 298B of section
298C of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)."
See supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 74, pt. I, para. 2.
8. The Subcommision is a subordinate investigatory body to the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights (U.N. Commission). The U.N. Commission is supervised by the
United Nations Economic and Social Council. For a discussion of the operations of the Sub-
commission, see generally Haver, The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1982);
Review of the Work of the Sub-Commission, Note by the Secretary General, 37 U.N. Subcom-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Agenda Item 3), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2 (1984).
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or not enforcement of Ordinance XX was resulting in gross violations
of human rights in Pakistan.10 In August of 1985, the Subcommission
passed Resolution 1985/21,11 which declared Ordinance XX prima
facie violative of international human rights standards. 12 The Sub-
commission resolved that Ordinance XX "violates the right to liberty
and security of persons, the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest or
detention, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
the right of religious minorities to profess and practice their own reli-
gion, and the right to an effective legal remedy." 13 The Subcommis-
sion, through the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, has
called upon Pakistan to repeal Ordinance XX.14 Despite Resolution
1985/21 and, notwithstanding the cessation of martial law in Pakistan
in December of 1985, Ordinance XX remains in effect. 15
Violations of human rights occur when states limit or suspend
protection of human rights, contrary to the standards of derogation
established by customary or conventional principles of international
law. 16 There are currently two derogation standards: 1) emergency
9. Two nongovernmental human rights organizations brought Ordinance XX to the at-
tention of the Subcommission in 1984. One group was the Minority Rights group. See Com-
mission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities: Summary Record of the 24th Meeting, 37 U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (24th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
SR.24 (1984). The second group was the Anti-Slavery Society. See Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission On Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Sum-
mary Record of the 23rd Meeting, 37 U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities (23rd mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.23 (1984).
10. The Subcommission derives its authority to make investigations with respect to
human rights violations from ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 (XXLII) and 1503 (XLVIII). The
latter specifically governs investigations of gross violations of human rights. See Haver, supra
note 8, at 119.
11. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including
Policies of Racial Discrimination and Segregation and of Apartheid, in all Countries, with Par-
ticular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories: Report of the
Subcommission Under Commission on Human Rights Resolution 8 (XXIII), The Situation in
Pakistan, 38 U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minor-
ities (Agenda Item 6), U.N. Doc. E/CR.4/Sub.2/4.42 (1985) [hereinafter Res. 1985/21].
12. Id. at 2, para. 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2, para. 3.
15. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of
the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territo-
ries: Written Statement Submitted by Human Rights Advocates; Inc., A Non-Governmental Or-
ganization in Consultative Status (category II), 42 U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights
(Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/30 (1986).
16. Conventional international law is that law which is articulated in treaties, whereas
customary international law is customs established as general rules of law as a result of contin-
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clause provisions, 17 which relate to situations of war or public emer-
gency, and 2) limitation clause provisions, 18 which relate to situations
which affect public health, safety, order, morals, or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others. 19
Case decisions from regional and United Nations human rights
bodies, 20 as well as studies by the Subcommission and various interna-
tional organizations of jurists, have developed concise rules of law
with respect to emergency clause derogation standards.21 The stan-
dards with respect to the limitation clause provisions are not as yet
developed, although the recently formulated Siracusa Principles22
have added guidelines that help clarify what constitutes a permissible
human rights derogation under non-emergency situations.
Freedom of religion is recognized as an inalienable, core right
which must be protected at all times.23 The inherent definition of
freedom of religion also makes it a qualified right, subject to state-
imposed restrictions. 24 In other words, its definition includes a limita-
tion clause. To date, freedom of religion is the only human right
which is considered both a core and a qualified right. For this reason,
ued usage over time by states who recognize the customs as obligatory. W. FRIEDMANN, A.
LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES & MATERIALS, 35-36 (1969).
17. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 62), U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) [hereinafter Int'l Pol. Covenant],
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, 1983, at
8-9, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/7/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983) [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
COMPILATION].
18. INT'L POL. COVENANT, art. 18, reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra note
17, at 11.
19. Id.
20. For decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS COMMIT-
TEE SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL (Second to sixteenth sessions),
1985, U.N. Doc. CCPR/OP/1, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 (1985) [hereinafter SELECTED DE-
CISIONS]. For decisions emanating from the European Court and Commission on Human
Rights, see generally H. PETZOLD, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1984); EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: STOCK-TAK-
ING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1984) [hereinafter STOCK-TAK-
ING]. For case decisions emanating from the Inter-American Court and Commission on
Human Rights, see generally T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982).
21. Lillich, The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emer-
gency, 79 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1072, 1073 (1985).
22. The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 3 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Siracusa Principles].
23. See infra text accompanying note 42.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
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freedom of religion should more appropriately be called a quasi-core
right.
As a result of its unique status as a quasi-core right, freedom of
religion can be limited during periods of peace under limitation clause
standards. Freedom of religion cannot, however, be limited in any
way during periods of war or public emergency under the emergency
clause provisions.
25
Consequently, while the original purposes for enacting Ordi-
nance XX during a state of emergency may have violated interna-
tional law, continued enforcement of Ordinance XX after the lifting
of martial law for the same purposes may not be a violation of inter-
national law.26 This result seems contrary to the policy behind elevat-
ing a particular human right to the level of a core right, namely, to
accord it more, not less, protection.27
Part I of this Comment focuses on the inherent weaknesses in the
current definition of the right to freedom of religion. Part II traces
the historical development of international human rights standards
with respect to protection of the right to freedom of religion and prin-
ciples of derogation. Part III analyzes Ordinance XX under the dero-
gation standards outlined in both the emergency clause and the
limitation clause. Finally, Part IV proposes changes to clarify the sta-
tus of the right to freedom of religion. Part IV also recommends
changes to reconcile the inconsistencies currently existing between the
derogation standards of the emergency clause and the limitation
clause.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of State Responsibility to Protect the Right to
Freedom of Religion
The right to freedom of religion is recognized as both a political
and a religious duty.28 As early as the seventh century, the Code of
25. See infra text accompanying note 69.
26. See infra text following note 209.
27. Lillich, supra note 21, at 1072.
28. For a historical discussion of the development of the concept of freedom of religion in
international law, see generally Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 1-23. For a summary of re-
gional and United Nations declarations and treaties which address the problem of discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or belief, see generally Elimination ofAll Forms of Religious
Intolerance, Note by the Secretary-General Prepared in Accordance with Resolution 1982/28 of
the Sub-Commission, 36 U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities (Agenda Item 15), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/29 (1983).
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Conduct issued by the founder of Islam, the Prophet Mohammed,
provided:
To the Christians of Najran and its neighbouring territories, the
security of God and the pledge of Mohammed the Prophet, the
Messenger of God, are extended for their lives, their religion, their
land, their property .... The status quo shall be maintained; none
of their rites (religious observances) and images shall be changed.
No bishop shall be removed from his bishopric, nor a monk from
his monastery, nor a sexton from his church. 29
1. Development of conventional international human rights law
Starting as early as the sixteenth century and continuing through
World War II, states have guaranteed within multilateral treaties the
rights of religious minorities - as individuals and as groups - to
profess and practice their religion.30 The Geneva Convention memo-
rialized the rights of both civilians and prisoners during periods of
war to profess and practice their religion.31 The Charter of the
United Nations mandates its member states to "promote universal re-
spect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."' 32 Ac-
cordingly, in 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),
which identifies the various rights and freedoms protected under the
United Nations Charter.
33
Subsequent to the adoption of the Universal Declaration, various
United Nations treaties and declarations have specifically detailed
particular rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration.34 Thus,
article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(International Political Covenant)3 5 provides the following definition
29. Krishnaswami, supra note 1, at 2.
30. Id. at 4.
31. In particular, see article 34 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3346, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
164; see also articles 24, 27, 38, 58, 86 & 93 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3535, 3536, 3542, 3555,
3372, 3577, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 304, 306, 312, 325, 342, 347.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/811, at
1 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra
note 17, at 1.
34. See generally HUM. RTs. COMPILATION, supra note 17, at iii. This source reprints
human rights treaties and declarations.
35. Int'l Pol. Covenant, reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra note 17, at 11.
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of the right to freedom of religion:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.36
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on Reli-
gion)37 further expands the definition provided in the International
Political Covenant by detailing the rights of individuals, the duties of
states, and the composite rights included within the right to manifest
one's religion or belief.
3 8
At the regional level, organizations of states have ratified human
rights treaties which parallel the protections contained in the various
United Nations conventions regarding freedom of religion. 39
At both the United Nations and regional levels, certain core
rights are specified as inalienable. 4° That is, a state cannot in any
way, either directly or indirectly, restrict or suspend core rights dur-
ing periods of war or periods of peace.41 Freedom of religion has been
uniformly recognized as one of the inalienable, core rights.42
2. Development of Pakistani law
Pakistan also recognizes the principles of freedom of religious
practice and belief in the preamble and in article 20 of the Pakistan
36. Id.
37. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief [hereinafter Declaration on Religion], G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982), reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILA-
TION, supra note 17, at 48.
38. Id.
39. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[hereinafter European Convention], reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASIC TEXTS 3 [hereinafter BASIC TEXTS]; American Convention on
Human Rights [hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at 66;
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights [hereinafter African Charter], reprinted in 24
INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 76 (1980).
40. American Convention, art. 13, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39, at 71; Euro-
pean Convention, art. 9, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at 7; African Convention, art. 8,
reprinted in 24 INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 76, 77 (1980); see also Questiaux, Study of the Impli-
cations for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations known as State of
Siege or Emergency, 35 U.N. Commission on Human Rights (Agenda Item 10), U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/15 (1982).
41. Lillich, supra note 21, at 1074.
42. Id. at 1080.
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Constitution. 43 Human rights in general, and freedom of religion in
particular, are likewise protected by the Injunctions of Islam,44 which
are incorporated into the Pakistan Constitution 45 and which remained
in effect during martial law. 46 Although the constitutional right to
freedom of religion was suspended from July 1977 until December
1985, 4 7 President Zia nonetheless stated constantly that his govern-
ment recognized and protected freedom of religion, as well as the
rights of minorities.48 Thus, at all times, freedom of religion has re-
mained a recognized principle of domestic law within Pakistan.
Pakistan is also bound, under customary principles of interna-
tional law, to protect the right to freedom of religion. Moreover, as a
signatory state to the Geneva Conventions, 49 Pakistan is obligated to
protect freedom of religion during periods of war. As a member of
the United Nations, Pakistan is also bound to preserve and protect the
right to freedom of religion, in accordance with articles 1.3, 55(c) and
56 of the United Nations Charter.50
B. Development of Principles of Derogation
Principles of derogation address two questions. First, principles
of derogation address which particular rights are inalienable, core
rights; that is, rights which are not subject to any derogation by the
state.51 Second, principles of derogation define under what circum-
43. AAEEN (Constitution), preamble, art. 20 (Pakistan) (1973, suspended 1977, rein-
stated 1985).
44. The Injunctions of Islam are embodied in the Shariat, which is the canonical law of
the Islamic faith. The Shariat incorporates the Holy Quran, Mohammed's words coming di-
rectly from God, as well as the Sunnah, a code of model behavior derived from the traditions
of Mohammed's sayings and deeds. The Shariat provisions thus encompass both religous as
well as social duties. See Note, Human Rights Practices in the Arab States. The Modern Im-
pact of Sharia Values, 12 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. 55 (1982).
45. AAEEN (Constitution), art. 2, 227 (Pakistan) (1973, suspended 1977, reinstated 1985).
46. In July 1977, President Zia suspended part II of the Constitution. However, article
227, which is in part IX of the Constitution, remained in effect. See Chief Martial Law Ad-
ministrator's Order 1 of 1977, reprinted in 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 123 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986).
47. Id.; see also L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
48. For example, in 1980 the government announced that "[tihere would be no interfer-
ence in the religious beliefs of individuals," and that "no one dogma would be imposed on any
Muslim sect." Pakistan Affairs, July 16, 1980, at 1, col. 3. In 1984, in a speech before a Shiite
convention a few weeks after issuing Ordinance XX, President Zia "insisted that religious
minorities would be zealously protected." COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at xxviii.
49. Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classification and Chart
showing ratifications as of ) January 1985, 5 HUM. RTs. L.J. 376 (1984).
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 3, 55(c), 56.
51. Lillich, supra note 21, at 1074; Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 12.
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stances and to what extent states can limit or suspend protection of all
other noncore human rights. 52
Core rights are defined as fundamental rights which cannot be
violated under any circumstances. 53 A state cannot directly restrict
or suspend core rights by law or state sanctioned conduct.5 4 Nor can
a state indirectly restrict or suspend core rights by enacting laws with
respect to noncore rights which by their terms, or by their enforce-
ment procedures, violate core rights. 55 Thus, core rights are nondero-
gable. International law currently recognizes twelve core rights,56
including the right to freedom of religion, and the prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, color, language, religion, or so-
cial origin.
57
Noncore rights are those human rights which may be limited or
suspended by a state. 58 A state may derogate from its obligation to
protect noncore rights under two circumstances: 1) during war or
public emergencies; 59 and 2) in order to protect national security,
public health, safety, order, morals, or the rights and freedoms of
others.60
52. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 1-8; Lillich, supra note 21, at 1073-75.
53. O'Donnell, Commentary by the Rapporteur on Derogation, 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 12 (1985).
54. Lillich, supra note 21, at 1074-75.
55. Id.
56. The number of core rights have recently expanded. Existing international conven-
tions, including the Geneva Conventions, all acknowledge the following core rights: right to
life, prohibition against torture, prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, prohibition against slavery; and prohibition of retroactive penal measures. These
core rights are binding on all states, whether the states are signatories to a convention or not,
as principles of customary international law. Questiaux, supra note 40, at 18-19; Siracusa
Principles, supra note 22, at 12. The additional rights of freedom of thought, conscience, reli-
gion, and the right to recognition of legal personality are recognized in the above instruments
with the exception of the European Convention. Questiaux, supra note 40, at 19. Recently,
however, the international community has added the following core rights - which currently
appear only in the American Convention - to the list of core rights accepted under customary
international law: the right to a name; the rights of a child; the rights of a family; the right to a
nationality; the right to participate in government; the right against discrimination solely on
the basis of race, sex, color, language, religion, or social origin; and the right to a fair trial.
Lillich, supra note 21, at 1075-81.
57. Lillich, supra note 21, at 1080.
58. Kiss, Commentary by the Rapporteur on Limitation Provisions, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 15
(1985).
59. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 7-9.
60. Id. at 9. Similar emergency clause provisions appear in regional human rights con-
ventions. See European Convention, art. 15, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39, at 8;
American Convention, art. 27, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at 75.
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1. Emergency clause provisions
Pursuant to article 4 of the International Political Covenant:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Par-
ties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discriminations solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
61
a. International law standards and decisions
Contemporary standards of customary international law have
further clarified the emergency clause provisions as incorporating the
following principles. 62 First, a public emergency is defined as "an ex-
ceptional situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent,
which affects the whole population" 63 of the state or area to which the
derogation measures apply. 64 Second, threats to the life of the nation
must rise to the level of a "threat to the organized life of the commu-
nity" affected. 65 Third, principles of strict necessity apply in an objec-
tive manner. 66 Thus, apprehensions or fears of potentially dangerous
situations do not constitute a public emergency. 67 Fourth, ordinary
measures permissible under the specific limitation clauses must be in-
adequate to deal with the situation.68 Fifth, core rights remain
nonderogable during periods of public emergency. 69 Finally, ade-
quate remedies must be available to persons who claim derogation
measures affecting them are not strictly required.70 These should in-
clude, at a minimum, those guarantees necessary to ensure a fair trial
which are mandated by the Geneva Conventions. 71 Under article 3
61. Int'l Pol. Covenant, art. 4, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39, at 8.
62. See generally Siracusa Principles, supra note 22; Lillich, supra note 21.
63. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 7; Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUM.
RTS. 71-72 (1969).
64. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 7.
65. O'Donnell, supra note 53, at 25; see also Questiaux, supra note 40, at 8, 15.
66. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Questiaux, supra note 40, at 12.
70. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 9.
71. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3117, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
670 [Vol. 9:661
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common to all four of the Geneva Conventions, fair trial rights in-
clude the right to be tried by a regularly constituted court and, as a
part of the right to life and security of persons, a prohibition against
arbitrary arrest and detention.
72
Under customary international law, an arrest is arbitrary
73 if it
fails to adequately protect human rights because the right to arrest
has been too broadly defined. 74 Similarly, if the law or the procedures
for effectuating the law are unjust or unreasonable, the law itself is
arbitrary. 75 By the same token, where laws or procedures are enacted
or tolerated by a government in contradiction of prior national legisla-
tion or prosecuted by a body not normally competent to prosecute,
the laws or procedures are illegal by international standards.
76
Case decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (Euro-
pean Commission) have added the following clarifications to the
emergency clause provisions. In its examination of the Lawless case, 77
which involved Ireland's imposition of restrictions on Irish Republi-
can Army activities, the European Court noted that derogation meas-
ures "must be based on existing facts only, and cannot take account of
subjective predictions as to future developments or unilateral fears
that (a) situation may degenerate and the threat (of a public emer-
gency) increase.
' 78
In the Greek case, 79 an investigation of the Greek Government's
U.N.T.S. 31, 32; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
3221, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3319, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
136; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3519, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 289.
72. Id.
73. Prohibitions against arbitrary arrest and detention appear in Article 9 of the Univer-
sal Declaration, Universal Declaration, art. 9, reprinted in HUM. RTs. COMPILATION, supra
note 17, at 1; article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Int'l Pol.
Covenant, art. 10, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39, at 103; article 7 of the American
Convention, American Convention, art. 7, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at 69; articles 5-7
of the European Convention, European Convention, arts. 5-7, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS,
supra, at 6-7; and article 6 of the African Charter, African Charter, art. 6, reprinted in 24
INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 76-77 (1980).
74. Marcoux, Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Under International Law, 5
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 367 n.155 (1982).
75. Id. at 368.
76. Id.; Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 10.
77. Lawless v. Republic of Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B)(1960-61).
78. Id. at 94.
79. Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RT. (1969).
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declaration of a state of siege in 1967, the European Commission
noted that in order to justify public emergency derogation measures,
normal measures or less restrictive alternatives must be plainly inade-
quate or unavailable. 80
With respect to the right to a fair trial, the European Commis-
sion determined in the Greek case that the extraordinary courts mar-
tial were not independent tribunals because they exercised their
jurisdiction under authority of the Minister of National Defense.
81
Thus, the court concluded that the jurisdiction of courts martial
should be limited to cases against members of the Armed Forces or
acts committed against members of the Armed Forces, and that ordi-
nary criminal courts alone should try civilian cases, including charges
of offenses against public order or national security.
8 2
The United Nations Human Rights Committee8 3 has likewise de-
termined that military judges subordinated to the authority of the mil-
itary hierarchy are not independent, and that military cases should
therefore be subject to review by ordinary courts.
8 4
Additionally, with respect to the language of the law itself, the
European Commission declared in the Greek case that a legislative
decree is overbroad if it leaves the definition of the offense to a disci-
plinary council, making it impossible for an individual to know be-
forehand whether or not his acts are lawful. 85
Finally, case decisions on the issue of arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion have led to the following conclusions. First, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has suggested that a lapse of more
80. Id. at 71-72.
81. Id. at 164.
82. See Weisz v. Uruguay, Commun. No. 28/1978, reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 20, at 57, 60; DeTouron v. Uruguay, Commun. No. 32/1978, reprinted in BASIC
TEXTS, supra note 39, at 61-63; see also Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice,
pt. II, art. 2.06, reprinted in The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees:
Study on the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the
Independence of Lawyers; Final Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. L.M. Singhyi, 38 U.N.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Annex IV
(Agenda Item 9(c)) at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/18/Add.6 (1985).
83. The United Nations Human Rights Committee derives its investigatory authority
from article 41 of the International Political Covenant and article 7 of the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant. See Int'l Pol. Covenant, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39,
at 107; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at
110.
84. Consuelo Salgar de Motenjo v. Colombia, Commun. No. 64/1979, reprinted in SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 127, 130.
85. Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 164 (1969).
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than five days prior to being formally charged violates international
law.8 6 Second, the Human Rights Committee has held that a four-
month delay prior to being brought before a judge violates the Inter-
national Political Covenant. 87 Finally, the Human Rights Committee
has also consistently held that denial of a habeas corpus hearing vio-
lates the International Political Covenant.
88
b. Derogation provisions under the Pakistan Constitution
The Pakistan Constitution distinguishes between derogable and
nonderogable human rights.8 9 Freedom of religion is classified as a
derogable right.90 Derogable rights may be suspended while a procla-
mation of emergency is in force, but only for a maximum period of
four months without National Assembly approval. 9' Additionally,
any law enacted by Parliament which would not have been issued
without a Proclamation of Emergency expires six months after the
Proclamation of Emergency has ceased to be in force, unless measures
are taken to continue the validity of the law.92
The scope of derogation measures under the Pakistan Constitu-
tion appears to parallel the international standards articulated in the
emergency clause provisions of international human rights treaties.
For example, pursuant to article 232 of the Pakistan Constitution, an
emergency exists when the security of Pakistan, in whole or in part, is
threatened by war, external aggression, or by an internal disturbance
"beyond the power" of the provincial or federal government to con-
trol.93 Thus under the Pakistan Constitution, the emergency must be
national in scope, and actually existing or imminent.
2. Limitation clause provisions
Limitation clause provisions provide that a particular right "may
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect national security, public safety, order, health or
86. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Columbia, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, 83-88, reprinted in T. BUERGENTHAL, R. MORRIS, & D. SHELTON,
supra note 20, at 206, 210.
87. Carballal v. Uruguay, Commun. No. 33/1979, reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 20, at 63, 65.
88. Id. at 65.
89. AAEEN (Constitution) art. 8(5) (Pakistan) (1973, suspended 1977, reinstated 1985).
90. Id. at art. 20.
91. Id. at art. 232(8).
92. Id. at art. 232(7)(b).
93. Id. at art. 232.
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morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. ' ' 94 Under
the United Nations and regional treaties, the limitation clause is part
of the definition of protection of the following rights: freedom of
movement and choice of residence, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, the right to privacy, the right to property, and the right to
freedom of religion. 95 Accordingly, freedom of religion is a core right,
and at the same time it is a derogable right.
a. international law standards and decisions
Although little scholarly work is available in this area,96 the
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa
Principles) were recently formulated. 97 The Siracusa Principles clar-
ify in general terms the scope and definition of many of the limitation
clause provisions.
The Siracusa Principles have set forth the following standards.
A limitation which is justifiably "necessary" is one that responds to a
pressing public or social need, pursues a legitimate governmental aim,
and is proportionate to the governmental aim. 98 A limitation "pre-
scribed by law" cannot be applied so as to jeopardize the essence of
the right limited. 99 Thus, by implication, and unlike the emergency
clause provisions, a limitation clause derogation can only restrict the
right to which it applies. A limitation clause derogation cannot to-
tally eliminate or suspend that right. In addition, the law cannot be
vague, arbitrary or unreasonable in content or application. 00 To
guarantee the appropriateness of the law, adequate safeguards and ef-
fective legal remedies must be available against illegal or abusive ap-
plication of the law. 10' Impliedly, then, the same trial rights provided
under the emergency clause also apply under the limitation clause. 0 2
Limitations cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, lan-
94. Int'l Pol. Covenant, arts. 19, 21, 22, reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, .supra
note 17, at 11.
95. Int'l Pol. Covenant, arts. 12, 19, 22, 18, reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra
note 17, at 10-11.
96. But cf. Kiss, supra note 58; O'Donnell, supra note 53.
97. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 1.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Kiss, supra note 58, at 18.
102. Id. at 19.
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guage, religion or social origin, or violate any other core right.10 3 The
limitations clauses are to be interpreted strictly and in favor of the
right at issue. 1°4 Finally, the limitation cannot lower the protection
for any human right to a greater extent than that which is permissible
under international law.105
The situations to which limitation clause provisions apply are
broadly defined.' 0 6 To date, the following definitions have emerged.
"Public safety" means protection against danger to the safety of per-
sons or their physical integrity, or serious damage to their property.
10 7
A limitation on public morals must be "essential to the maintenance
of respect for fundamental values of the community."' 1 8 It must also
not be arbitrary, 10 9 and must allow for challenges and remedies
against abuse. Similarly, "public order" is defined as "the sum of
rules which ensure[s] the functioning of society or the set of funda-
mental principles on which society is founded.""110 "Public health" is
defined as a serious threat to the population or individual members of
the population." 'I
Case decisions of international human rights bodies to date have
focused on the application of the limitation clause to the right to free-
dom of speech. In Handyside v. United Kingdom, " 2 a 1974 obscenity
case, the European Court stated that while state authorities are in a
better position than international judges to decide the content and ne-
cessity of restrictions based on the concept of public morals,' ' 3 every
restriction or penalty imposed must be proportionate to a legitimate
goal based upon an assessment of the reality of a pressing social
need.'1 4 Thus, states are given wide latitude to define public morals
consistent with the needs of their particular society.' '5 However, the
pressing social need must be existing or imminent.'16
103. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 5-7.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. Kiss, supra note 58, at 16.
110. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 5.
111. Id. at 6.
112. Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
113. Id. at 22, para. 48.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21, para. 47; accord, Hertzberg v. Finland, Commun. No. 61/1979, reprinted in
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 124, 125.
116. Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) 22, para. 48 (1976).
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Three years later in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 17 another
free speech case, the European Court articulated a facts and circum-
stances test to balance governmental and public interests to determine
whether a limitation was proportionate to a legitimate goal pursued
by the government." 8 The European Court concluded that the limi-
tation must "correspond to a social need sufficiently pressing to out-
weigh the public interest in (the right limited)." '" 9 The Sunday Times
court also concluded that in order for limitations to be validly pre-
scribed by law, the restrictions must give a citizen reasonable notice
and specificity as to what conduct will result in a violation of law.'
20
b. Pakistan Constitutional provisions
Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution provides that the right to
freedom of religion is "[s]ubject to law, public order and morality.' 2'
Although "public order" and "public morality" are not specifically
defined in the constitution, other limitation clause provisions in the
constitution require that restrictions be reasonable, 22 imposed by law,
and be in the public interest. 23 Restrictions must also be consistent
with protection of other human rights provisions.
24
c. analytical comparison of the derogation clause standards
A comparison of the emergency clause and the limitation clause
standards reveals three significant distinctions. First, a threat under
the emergency clause provisions must be national in scope and impact
before limitations will be justified. Conversely, no clear definition of
the scope of a "pressing social need" has as yet been articulated under
the limitation clause provisions. Second, the terms under the emer-
gency clause are more precise, in definition and scope, than are the
terms under the limitation clause. It would appear that the limitation
clause terms need to be more narrowly defined.
Finally, and most importantly, the derogation measures under
the emergency clause provisions are limited "to the extent strictly re-
117. Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, para. 49 (1979), involved an appeal
from a court order preventing publication of an article concerning thalidomide children while
litigation involving a thalidomide manufacturer was pending before the court. Id. at 9-10.
118. Id. at 40, para. 65.
119. Id. at 42, para. 67.
120. Id. at 31, para. 49.
121. AAEEN (Constitution) art. 20 (Pakistan) (1973, suspended 1977, reinstated 1985).
122. See, e.g., id. at art. 15.
123. Id.
124. Id. at art. 8(2).
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quired by the exigencies of the circumstances."'' 25 In other words, the
test to determine the validity of the restriction under this provision is
that the restriction must be proportionate to an existing dangerous
situation.126 This not only narrows the scope, but also the duration of
the permissible derogation measures.
On the other hand, the test to determine the reasonableness of a
limitation clause restriction is not whether it is proportionate to the
disturbance at hand but, rather, whether it is proportionate to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose. This test for the limitation clause
stretches the relationship between the restriction and the underlying
problem that it addresses, injecting between the two elements a pur-
pose requirement. The resulting focus is on the governmental intent,
rather than the proportionality of the limitation. Consequently, a
state can impose a restriction on a human right under the limitation
clause which is necessary and proportionate to a legitimate govern-
mental aim, but which has only a minimal connection or tangential
effect upon the actual public disturbance.
Overall, the emergency clause standards appear to be more strin-
gent, objective, and narrowly tailored than are the limitation clause
standards. Accordingly, it appears that the emergency clause stan-
dards are geared more toward effectively and efficiently resolving a
threatening situation than are the limitation clause provisions. In
fact, the limitation clause provisions appear to be so loosely defined
that a state could potentially derogate from its obligation to protect
human rights during a non-crisis period to a greater extent or over a
longer period of time than it could during a crisis period.
d. application of the two standards to the right
to freedom of religion.
The emergency clauses of United Nations and regional human
rights treaties specifically provide that no derogation of the right to
freedom of religion may be made during the time of war or public
emergency. 127 However, the limitation clause is included within the
definition of the right to freedom of religion.128 Thus, application of
125. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 3.
126. Id. at 9; see also Questiaux, supra note 40, at 15.
127. See supra text accompanying note 42.
128. See Int'l Pol. Covenant, art. 18(3), reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra note
17, at 11; Declaration of Religion, art. 1(3), reprinted in HUM. RTS. COMPILATION, supra, at
49; American Convention, art. 13(2), reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra note 39, at 71; European
Convention, art. 9, reprinted in BASIC TEXTS, supra, at 7.
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the emergency clause to the right to freedom of religion can be inter-
preted two ways. One interpretation is that during periods of public
emergency, existing limitations on the right to freedom of religion
may continue but no new limitations may be imposed. This interpre-
tation is supported by virtue of the fact that freedom of religion is the
only right that does not include in its limitation clause a derogation
for national security purposes. Hence, by implication, states cannot
restrict this right during public emergencies, whereas they can during
non-emergency periods. 129
The second interpretation is that a state can take derogation
measures during public emergency periods, but only to the extent per-
missible under the limitation clause. This interpretation in effect
cancels the core status of the right to freedom of religion, and guaran-
tees only that a state must at a minimum secure the freedom of reli-
gion rights specified in the Geneva Conventions.1 30 Those rights
include the right to attend community services,13' the right of chil-
dren to exercise their religion,1 32 the right to nondiscrimination based
solely on race, sex, color, language or religion, 133 and the right to dis-
tribute books and articles.1
34
If the second interpretation is adopted, however, then it is un-
clear which derogation standards apply to determine the appropriate-
ness of a limitation on the right to freedom of religion during public
emergencies. Arguably, the emergency clause standards should ap-
ply, since the limitation is imposed during an emergency period. On
the other hand, imposing a stricter standard of protection upon a state
during a period when its continued existence is at stake would seem to
be unreasonable and tantamount to a penalty. Because of the uncer-
tainty in the law with respect to this issue, this Comment will analyze
Ordinance XX under both derogation standards.
III. ANALYSIS OF ORDINANCE XX
A. Provisions of Ordinance XX
Ordinance XX expressly bans the public manifestation of the
Ahmadiyya faith. Part I of this law declares Ordinance XX to be a
129. See Kiss, supra note 58, at 21.
130. See supra note 71 (citing article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions).
131. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 34, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3364, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 164.
132. Id. art. 24, at 163-64.
133. Id. art. 27, at 165.
134. Id. art. 58, at 175.
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criminal statute that applies only to Ahmadiyyas;135 Part II prohibits
Ahmadiyyas from publically using Islamic religious terminology in
connection with their religion. 36 Ahmadiyyas are also prohibited
from using religious titles, descriptions or epithets of Muslim ori-
gin, 37 or from using the word "Masjid" in connection with their
place of worship. 38 Ahmadiyyas cannot call or refer to their faith as
Islam, 39 and they cannot recite or refer to the mode or form of the
call to prayers as "Azan."''
4
In addition, Ahmadiyyas cannot practice their religion in com-
munity with others. Article 298C of the ordinance prohibits an
Ahmadiyya from preaching or propogating his faith, or inviting
others to accept his faith by oral or written language or by visual
representation.' 4' Similarly, Part IV of Ordinance XX prohibits
newspapers and publishers from printing or distributing Ahmadiyya
literature.' 42 Finally, Ordinance XX provides that any Ahmadiyya
who violates any of the above-described conduct, or "who, directly or
indirectly poses himself as a Muslim ... or by visual representations
or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Mus-
lims, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to a fine.""'43
Pakistan has stated to the United Nations Subcommission that
the purpose of Ordinance XX is "to restrain certain Ahmadiyya prac-
tices which offend Orthodox Muslims" 144 and which "could hurt the
sentiments of society in general and could lead to creating tension
between various sections of society."' 45 In other words, Pakistan ap-
135. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
136. Ordinance XX, supra note 2, at 74, pt. II, art. 298B(1)(d).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. pt. II, at art. 298C.
140. Id. pt. II, at art. 298B(2).
141. Id. pt. II, at art. 298C.
142. Id. pt. IV (6). In December of 1984, the government of Pakistan closed the
Ahmadiyya printing press located in Rabwah. The government also temporarily suspended
several of the publications of the Ahmadiyya community, including several periodicals and a
daily newspaper. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1985 at 1366 (1986).
143. Ordinance XX, supra note 2, at 74, pt. II, art. 298C.
144. Summary ofArbitrary Executions, Report by Special Rapporteur, Mr. S. Amos Wako,
Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1984/35 of 24 May 1984 of the Economic and Social Council,
41 U.N. Commission on Human Rights (Agenda Item 12) at 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.421 (1986).
145. Id.
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parently issued Ordinance XX in order to protect public morals and
public order.
B. Does Ordinance XX Violate Emergency Clause
Derogation Standards?
To be considered a permissible limitation on the Ahmadiyyas'
right to freedom of religion, there must have existed a serious nation-
wide threat to public morals or public order which threatened the
organized life of the nation at the time Ordinance XX was enacted in
April of 1984.146 In addition, the limitation measures set forth in Or-
dinance XX must have been strictly required by the exigencies of the
crisis, must not have infringed on any other core rights, and must not
have involved discrimination based solely on religion.147 Finally, the
limitation, at a minimum, must not remove those trial rights granted
under the Geneva Conventions.148
In 1977, President Zia proclaimed a state of emergency and es-
tablished martial law. 149 Martial law continued in effect until De-
cember 30, 1985.150 Hence, when Ordinance XX was enacted in
April of 1984, a state of public emergency in Pakistan actually ex-
isted. However, enactment of Ordinance XX was not strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation in Pakistan in 1984.
Nationwide political and religious strikes, demonstrations, and
riots occurred in Pakistan from 1979 through 1984.151 Students,
union employees, and lawyers were among those involved in civil dis-
obedience campaigns to protest the continued suspension of the 1973
constitution, 52 the imposition of martial law, and courts martial.
1 53
However, these political disturbances did not involve Ahmadiyyas,
146. Each derogation must be assessed independently in time and space. See Questiaux,
supra note 40, at 17.
147. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 69.
148. Siracusa Principles, supra note 22, at 11.
149. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at xxii.
150. See supra text accompanying note 47.
151. In February of 1981, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) held dem-
onstrations. In June, student demonstrations followed. Finally, in August of 1981, there was a
civil disobedience movement against local taxes, which resulted in the arrests of political work-
ers, students, and trade union employees. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982 at 223-24
(1982).
152. In 1983, nationwide demonstrations erupted in protest of the continued suspension of
the 1973 constitution. 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD XIX-XX (A.
Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986).
153. Sayeed, Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stress More Serious Than External Problems, 24
ASIAN SURv. 219, 222 (1984).
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and there is no evidence that the normal police measures were inade-
quate to quell the demonstrations. Thus, under article 232 of the Pak-
istan Constitution and under the Greek case, these disturbances do
not rise to the level of a national public threat which justifies restric-
tions upon the Ahmadiyyas right to practice their religion.1
54
Clashes between Sunni 5 5 and Shiite 5 6 Muslims also occured during
this period.'- 7 However, restrictions on Ahmadiyya religious activi-
ties were not the least restrictive or most effective means of settling
disputes between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Hence, Ordinance
XX was not a derogation measure strictly required to diminish the
religious unrest that existed in 1984.
From a historical perspective, the Zia government might reason-
ably have feared future sectarian strife involving Ahmadiyyas, since in
1953, anti-Ahmadiyya attacks by Sunni Muslims necessitated the im-
position of martial law in order to restore public order. 58 Moreover,
serious anti-Ahmadiyya riots again occurred in 1974.159 Neverthe-
less, predictions as to future clashes between Ahmadiyya and anti-
Ahmadiyya factions, absent existing facts demonstrating an imminent
crisis, are insufficient reasons to justify derogation measures.160 Any
public manifestations of the Ahmadiyya religion between 1982 and
1984 had not resulted in serious nationwide strife or necessitated the
154. See supra text accompanying note 80.
155. Sunni Muslims, who comprise the Muslim majority in Pakistan, believe Mohammed
is the last of the Prophets from God. See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 116, 125.
156. Shiite Muslims, some fifteen to twenty-five percent of the population, are concen-
trated in the Northwest Frontier Province, Punjab. One of the major doctrinal differences
between Shiites and Sunnis is the line of succession of the caliphate; the Shiites support the Ali
line, while the Sunnis suport the Umayyah line. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 124.
157. In October 1982, there were Shiite-Sunni riots in Karachi and in Lahore, resulting in
five dead and over two hundred wounded. Richter, Pakistan In 1984: Digging In, 25 ASIAN
SURV. 145, 150 (1984).
In February 1983, Sunni-Shiite street battles erupted in Karachi after a Shiite mosque was
set on fire. One week later, thousands of Shiites staged a sit-in, blocking one of the major
highways in the area. Haeri, Proxy War in Karachi: Sectarian Riots Fomented by Iran Adds to
Pakistan's Domestic Troubles, 30 SOUTH 28 (Apr. 1983).
Finally, in June of 1983, Sunni-Shiite clashes resulted in 40 deaths. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983 at 40.
158. In 1953 Sunni mob attacks against Ahmadiyyas led to riots that resulted in the impo-
sition of martial law. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 40, 124.
159. Following anti-Ahmadiyya riots in 1974, Ahmadiyyas were constitutionally defined
as non-Muslims. Article 260(3) of the 1973 Constitution and Chief Martial Law Order No. 2
of 1981 both exclude Ahmadiyyas from the definition of a Muslim in Pakistan. 11 CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD ix (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1982).
160. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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use of national armed forces. 161 In the Lawless case, the European
court stated that an "emergency, being only potential, having per-
sisted in virtually unchanged form for years and not having led to
serious disturbance of general public order or of external relations,
cannot be regarded as of exceptional gravity, but only as a latent
emergency of a minor degree."' 162 Thus, Ordinance XX cannot be jus-
tified as a preventative measure.
Since 1984, the potential unrest has been transformed into actual
strife. Ordinance XX has, in fact, provoked defiance on the part of
Ahmadiyyas, 163 and clashes have regularly occurred since enactment
of Ordinance XX between Ahmadiyya and anti-Ahmadiyya fac-
tions. 164 However, these clashes have not yet been beyond the ability
of local police authorities to handle, hence no public emergency exists
which justifies continued enforcement of Ordinance XX during post-
martial law. 1
65
Moreover, Ordinance XX is being enforced by the government of
Pakistan in an arbitrary manner. The language of Ordinance XX is
arbitrary in that it fails to give reasonable notice and specificity as to
what conduct will result in a violation and what form or amount of
punishment will be imposed. Ordinance XX broadly defines the right
to arrest an Ahmadiyya based on any conduct which "outrages" the
religious feelings of a Muslim. 166 Since the term "outrage" is not de-
fined within Ordinance XX, Ahmadiyyas have no way of knowing
what conduct rises to the level of an "outrage" prior to being arrested
and tried. Ordinance XX also states that Ahmadiyyas will be sub-
jected to "a fine", but no amount is set. 167 Thus Ahmadiyyas have no
way of knowing how much of a fine will be imposed prior to sentenc-
ing. Additionally, Part I of Ordinance XX states that "[tihe provi-
sions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any order or
161. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1982, at 222-26 (1982); AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL REPORT 1985, at 232-37 (1985).
162. Lawless v. Republic of Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 98 (1960-61). Similarly, the
Human Rights Committee has determined that "latent subversion" did not justify any deroga-
tion by the Chilean Government. See Questiaux, supra note 40, at 16.
163. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1984 at 1358 (1984).
164. Id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1986 at 247 (1986).
165. See supra text accompanying note 68.
166. Ordinance XX, supra note 2, at pt. II, art. 298C.
167. Id. at pt. II, arts. 298B, 298C.
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decision of any court."1 68 Thus, by implication, Ordinance XX can
be enforced without a judicial hearing. Hence, Ahmadiyyas have no
way of knowing before arrest whether they will be given a fair trial
before ordinary courts or summarily sentenced by a martial court.
As a result of the arbitrary language of Ordinance XX,
Ahmadiyyas have been subjected to arbitrary arrests, detentions, tri-
als and punishments. Ahmadiyyas have been arrested for defending
their mosques against anti-Ahmadiyya attacks. 69 Once arrested,
Ahmadiyyas have been held in detention without bail for up to six
months pending trial.170 Thus Ordinance XX has resulted in the im-
position of detention periods which exceeded international law stan-
dards.17 1 Some Ahmadiyyas have been tried by military courts which
are bodies not competent to prosecute civilians under the Pakistan
Constitution, 72 the Geneva Conventions, 73 and general principles of
international law. 174 The decisions of untrained military judges 75
have not been reviewed by ordinary courts, 76 even though harsh
sentences have been imposed. For example, when heavy fines have
been imposed, Ahmadiyya's personal property has been confis-
cated. 177 In addition, at least four people have been sentenced to 25
years imprisonment, and two people have been sentenced to death. 78
Therefore, enforcement of Ordinance XX has resulted in a denial of
the minimum rights to a fair trial which are guaranteed by the Ge-
neva Conventions. 79
Consequently, the stated purposes of protecting public morals
and public order does not justify derogation measures under the emer-
168. Id. at pt. II, art. 2. This provision appears to be an attempt to prospectively reverse
contrary court decisions.
169. See Amnesty International, Death Penalty and Legal Concern: Members of the
Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, Al Index: ASA 33/04/86 (Feb. 20, 1986).
170. Id.; see also Amnesty International, Pakistan: Imposition of Death Sentences on Nasir
Ahmad Qureshi and Rafi Ahmad Qureshi, Members of the Ahmadiyya Community, AI Index:
ASA 33/06/86 (Mar. 1985).
171. See supra text accompanying note 87.
172. AAEEN (Constitution) art. 175 (Pakistan) (1973, suspended 1977, reinstated 1985).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 76, 80-84.
175. See Amnesty International, supra note 170, at 3.
176. Id.
177. See Gross Violations of Human Rights: Written Statement Submitted by Human
Rights Advocates, a Non-Governmental Organization in Consultative Status (category II), 38
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Agenda
Item 6) at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO/23 (1985).
178. See Amnesty International, supra note 169, at 2.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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gency clause, because the disturbances relating to public morals and
public order did not create a situation of nationwide crisis in Pakistan
in 1984 beyond the control of the local officials. Ordinance XX was
not strictly required to alleviate the political or social unrest in Paki-
stan in 1984. Moreover, both the language and the enforcement pro-
cedures of Ordinance XX have exacerbated rather than ameliorated
the social tensions in Pakistan since 1984. Additionally, Ordinance
XX violates the core rights guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions.
Accordingly, the initial enactment, as well as the continued enforce-
ment of Ordinance XX, violates the emergency clause standards.
C. Does Ordinance XX Violate Limitation Clause
Derogation Standards?
The following limitation clause principles apply to Ordinance
XX. First, there must be a pressing social need which initially neces-
sitated enactment of Ordinance XX, as well as a pressing social need
justifying its continued enforcement. t80 Second, the government of
Pakistan must have had a legitimate aim for enacting and enforcing
Ordinance XX, and Ordinance XX must be proportionate to that
aim.18 1 Third, Ordinance XX must not jeopardize the essence of the
right to freedom of religion, 8 2 nor provide for lesser protection of the
right to freedom of religion than would be provided during a time of
war under the Geneva Conventions.1 83 Fourth, Ordinance XX must
not discriminate solely on the basis of religion.18 4 Finally, because the
Government of Pakistan has justified Ordinance XX on grounds of
public morality and public order, Ordinance XX must be essential to
the maintenance of respect for the fundamental values of society.185
The fundamental values of the people of Pakistan are embodied
in the Principles of Islam. 8 6 Ahmadiyyas believe in every fundamen-
tal tenet of Islam except one;187 they deny that Mohammed was the
180. See supra text accompanying note 98.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying note 99.
183. See supra text accompanying note 105.
184. See supra text accompanying note 103.
185. See supra text accompanying note 108.
186. Islam is the state religion of Pakistan. AAEEN (Constitution) art. 2 (Pakistan) (1973,
suspended 1977, reinstated 1985). In addition, all laws in Pakistan must conform to the In-
junctions of Islam. Id. at art. 227.
187. See Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Summary Record of the 24th Meeting, 37 U.N. Subcommission on
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final prophet. 88 Instead, the Ahmadiyyas believe that the Mirza
Ghulum Ahmad was the final prophet to have received a revelation
from God. 8 9 This denial of the finality of Mohammed has led Ortho-
dox Muslims to consider Ahmadiyyas apostates.190 Thus, use of reli-
gious terms to refer to anyone other than Mohammed implicitly
outrages Orthodox Muslims and presumably might offend some mem-
bers of the Muslim majority. It is unclear, by the existing definitions
of the limitation clause, whether protection of the "sentiments" of Or-
thodox Muslims or of society in general' 9' is a sufficiently pressing
need to outweigh the public interest in freedom of religious
expression.
In Handyside,192 the European Court determined that the right
to freedom of expression applied "not only to 'information' or 'ideas'
that are favourably [sic] received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb
the state or any sector of the population."'' 93 Thus, the mere fact that
Ahmadiyya religious ideas are offensive to Orthodox Muslims is an
insufficient reason to prohibit Ahmadiyyas from exercising their right
to preach and propagate their religion, at least within their own
community.
The question of whether Ahmadiyyas should be permitted to
proselytize polarizes two important Islamic tenets - the principle of
religious tolerance,194 and the finality of the Holy Prophet. 9 5 Since
international human rights bodies generally defer to the decision of
state authorities as to what constitutes public morals, Ordinance XX
can be interpreted as a reasonable public policy decision to protect the
concept of the finality of Mohammed as the more fundamental of the
two moral values of Pakistan. Arguably, then, there was in 1984, and
there continues to be, a pressing social need - and a corresponding
legitimate governmental goal - for Ordinance XX; namely, mainte-
Prevention of Discrimination and Prevention of Minorities (24th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/SR.24 (1984).
188. See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 124.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
192. Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
193. Id. at 22, para. 48.
194. The Quran states that "[e]ven with unbelievers, unless they are rampant and out to
destroy us and our Faith, we should deal kindly and equitably as is shown by our holy
Prophet's own example." THE HOLY QURAN 1544 (A. Ali ed. 1946).
195. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 124.
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nance of respect for the concept of the finality of Mohammed as a
fundamental element of public morals in Pakistan.
Accordingly, those sections of Ordinance XX which prohibit
Ahmadiyyas from using terms which signify the Holy Prophet in ref-
erence to someone other than Mohammed would be appropriately tai-
lored limitations, except for the fact that they are discriminatory.
Presumably, Orthodox Muslims would be equally offended if other
religious groups who do not believe in Mohammed improperly used
the same proscribed terms. Yet Ordinance XX does not prohibit the
use or misuse of these terms by non-Orthodox Muslims or by non-
Muslims. Thus, Ordinance XX amounts to a discriminatory limita-
tion based solely on religion. For these same reasons, prohibiting only
Ahmadiyyas from using other Islamic words which do not reference
the Holy Prophet also amounts to discrimination.
In addition, Ordinance XX appears to be disproportionate to thq
goal of preserving the public acknowledgement of the finality of Mo-
hammed because it not only prohibits the Ahmadiyya proselytizing,
but it also prohibits all Ahmadiyya community religious practices.
In X v. the United Kingdom,196 the European Court noted that
"the right to manifest one's religion in community with 'others' has
always been regarded as an essential part of the freedom of reli-
gion."' 197 The court held that "the two alternatives, 'either alone or in
community with others'. . . cannot be considered as mutually exclu-
sive or as leaving a choice to the authorities, but only as recognising
[sic] that the right may be practiced in either form."1 98 The Geneva
Conventions also implicitly recognize the right to religious practice in
community with others as an essential component to freedom of reli-
gion by protecting that practice during periods of war. 199
Although the right to manifest one's religion in community with
others is an "essential" component of the right to freedom of reli-
gion,200 international standards have not yet defined the community
right as the very "essence" of the right to freedom of religion. 20 1 In
other words, if the individual right to have or to adopt a particular
religion is so dependent upon the community manifestation of that
religion so that suspending the community rights is tantamount to
196. X v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 27 (1981).
197. Id. at 34, para. 5.
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
200. X v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 27 (1981).
201. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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eliminating the individual rights, 202 then Ordinance XX jeopardizes
the essence of the Ahmadiyya right to freedom of religion and is
therefore an impermissible restriction under the limitations clause.
Theoretically, community practices may not be important in
some religions. Arguably, these practices do constitute the essence of
the Ahmadiyya religion. The religious practices of the Ahmadiyya
faith emphasizes group activities to care for their brethren.203 The
Ahmadiyya community characteristically cares for its poor and finds
employment for its members.20 4 The Ahmadiyya community also
runs its own schools and welfare institutions. 205 Therefore, suspen-
sion of all community practices of the Ahmadiyyas impacts the
Ahmadiyyas as a collective group and as individuals. Suspension of
community practices eliminates the characteristics which distinguish
Ahmadiyyas, as a religious minority group, from other religious
groups. Suspension of community practices also deprives
Ahmadiyyas of their individual right to manifest their religious beliefs
through participation in Ahmadiyya community charity services.
Additionally, suspension of the right to worship with others and the
right to distribute religious literature violates the minimum commu-
nity religious rights guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. 206 Thus,
suspension of community practices deprives individual Ahmadiyyas
of the essence of their religion, which is the belief in and practice of
community charity.
Consequently, Ordinance XX can be justified under the limita-
tion clause as a law which is necessary to protect public morals.
However, it is discriminatory solely on the basis of religion, it is dis-
proportionate to its stated goal, and it jeopardizes the essence of the
Ahmadiyya right to freedom of religion. In addition, enforcement of
Ordinance XX violates the core rights to a fair trial for the reasons as
stated under the emergency clause analysis.20 7 Therefore, the initial
enactment as well as the continued enforcement of Ordinance XX vi-
olates the limitation clause standards.
202. See Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 102, 103 (1976).
203. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 124.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 166-79.
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D. Analytical Comparison of the Analysis of Ordinance XX
Under the Provisions of the Emergency Clause and
the Limitation Clause
A comparison of the analyses of Ordinance XX under the provi-
sions of the emergency clause and the limitation clause leads to the
following conclusions. The language and enforcement procedures of
Ordinance XX violate general principles of law under both derogation
standards. The terms of Ordinance XX are undefined, overbroad and
discriminatory solely on the basis of religion. As a result, Ordinance
XX has been enforced against the Ahmadiyyas in an arbitrary man-
ner. Ahmadiyyas have been subjected to long periods of detention,
and denied the right to trial or judicial review by the ordinary courts
in Pakistan.
However, the purposes for enacting Ordinance XX violate only
the emergency clause standards. Under the limitation clause, the gov-
ernment of Pakistan is given the discretion to determine at what point
there is a "pressing social need" to enact restrictive legislation in or-
der to reduce sectarian strife. On the other hand, under the emer-
gency clause, the government cannot enact legislation until the
sectarian strife becomes a crisis affecting the entire population and
organized life of Pakistan. Furthermore, under the limitation clause,
the legislative response to the sectarian strife need only be proportion-
ate to the legitimate governmental goal of protecting public morals
with respect to the concept of the finality of Mohammed, whereas
under the emergency clause, the legislation must make it possible to
abate or bring to an end the sectarian strife causing the national cri-
sis. 2°8 Finally, under the limitation clause, derogation measures may
continue in force indefinitely so long as it proportionately pursues the
goal of protecting public religious morals, whereas under the emer-
gency clause, the derogation measures are provisional in nature and
must be rescinded once the national crisis is over.20 9 Thus, Pakistan
can indefinitely restrict the community manifestation of the
Ahmadiyya religion as a matter of public policy for the purpose of
protecting public religious morals under the limitation clause, but not
under the emergency clause.
Assuming, arguendo, that Ordinance XX was amended so that
the language and enforcement procedures complied with the mini-
208. See Questiaux, supra note 40, at 17.
209. See id. at 24.
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mum standards under international law, 210 Ordinance XX would still
be discriminatory on the basis of religion. If, however, Ordinance XX
was further amended to prohibit all community religious activities ex-
cept those activities guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions for all
religions other than the dominant Muslim majority, 211 Ordinance XX
would no longer be discriminatory or disproportionate to the legiti-
mate governmental goal of reducing sectarian strife by protecting
public religious morals.
The remaining question is whether prohibiting, in Pakistan, the
community religious activities of all religions except one jeopardizes
the essence of the general right to freedom of religion. There are cur-
rently no clear international legal guidelines to answer this question.
If the essence of freedom of religion in general is not the manifestation
of community religious activities, then Ordinance XX, as amended,
could continue in force post martial law for an indefinite period under
the limitation clause. Accordingly, Ordinance XX as amended, could
restrict the right to freedom of religion to a greater extent and over a
longer period of time under the limitation clause than under the emer-
gency clause.
This result negates the protections guaranteed to the right of
freedom of religion as an inalienable, core right and demonstrates a
need to clarify the definition of freedom of religion with respect to
community religious activities. This result also demonstrates the need
to resolve the inconsistencies between the derogation standards under
the emergency clause and the limitation clause so that states cannot
under ordinary circumstances restrict the right to freedom of religion
to a greater extent than they could under situations which threaten
the life of the nation.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Protection of the Right to Freedom of Religion
1. Ordinance XX of 1985 should be rescinded
Analysis of Ordinance XX under both the emergency clause and
the limitation clause standards demonstrates that enactment of Ordi-
nance XX violates international law and Pakistani law, as does its
continued enforcement. International law places an affirmative duty
210. This would include setting a maximum for the fine amount, defining what constitutes
an "outrage to the religious feelings of Muslims," and providing fair trial rights accorded
under the Geneva Conventions. See supra text accompanying notes 166-73.
211. This would include Shiite and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan. See supra notes 155-56.
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on states to correct legislation which violates human rights.212 Ac-
cordingly, Resolution 1985/21 "requests the Commission on Human
Rights to call on the Government of Pakistan to repeal Ordinance XX
and to restore the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all per-
sons in its jurisdiction. ' 213 Therefore, Ordinance XX of 1985 should
be rescinded immediately.
2. Proposed Clarifications of the Definition of Freedom of
Religion under International Law
Freedom of religion is an essential human right which is appro-
priately considered a core right.214 To ensure minimal state deroga-
tion of this right, this Comment proposes the following changes.
First, the right to freedom of religion should be recognized as an
essential community right. Accordingly, the current wording of the
definition of the right to freedom of religion in international conven-
tions should be changed from practice "alone or in community with
others" 215 to practice alone and in community with others.
Secondly, international human rights conventions should amend
the limitation clause in either one of two ways to clarify its status as a
core right. To guarantee the greatest possible protection of the right
to freedom of religion, all limitation language should be completely
eliminated. Alternatively, the current limitation clause language
should be amended to specifically detail the exact scope and circum-
stances under which a state may permissively restrict the right to free-
dom of religion. Conversely, the limitation clause should state exactly
what cannot be restricted, which at a minimum are those protections
contained in the Geneva Conventions. 216 This alternative would pro-
212. Int'l Pol. Covenant, art. 2, provides:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Int'l Pol. Covenant, art. 2, reprinted in HUM. RTs. COMPILATION, supra note 17, at 8.
See also Declaration on Religion, art. 4, which provides that "[a]ll states shall make all
efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and
to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other
beliefs in this matter." Declaration on Religion, art. 4, reprinted in HUM. Ris. COMPILATION,
supra note 17, at 49.
213. Re& 1985/21, supra note 11, at 2.
214. See supra text accompanying note 40.
215. HUM. RTs. COMPILATION, supra note 17, at 11.
216. See supra text accompanying note 128.
690 [Vol. 9:661
Pakistan Ordinance XX of 1984
vide clearer guidelines to enable states to conform their national legis-
lation to international law standards. This alternative should also
reduce the possibility of abusive application of inconsistent or impre-
cise principles of derogation.
B. Clarification of the Principles of Derogation
Limitation clause provisions need to be more clearly defined.
Ideally, derogation measures under the limitation clause provisions
should be consistent with derogation measures under the emergency
clause. Toward that end, more objective definitions of the terms
"public order", "public morals", and "public safety" should be
adopted. In addition, the scope and the level of urgency of the "press-
ing social need" requirement should be clarified. For example, a
pressing social need might be defined as an existing or imminent dan-
gerous situation that is incapable of resolution by the state or local
officials, and which affects the culture, lives, economy, property, or
functioning of vital social services of a geographically cohesive com-
munity or of the nation as a whole.
The definition "as necessary" should be amended to add a re-
quirement which provides that derogation measures must be strictly
required for the exigencies of the circumstances. In addition, the
scope of the "as necessary" clause should be limited by an express
provision - as is currently a part of the emergency clause standards
- that core rights are nonderogable.
Finally, a requirement should be incorporated into both the
emergency clause and the limitation clause standards which provides
that states are under a positive duty - semi-annually or annually -
to amend or rescind prior legislation which is no longer required
under present circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has focused on the need for additional clarifica-
tion of the international human rights standards which protect the
right to freedom of religion. As highlighted by an analysis of Pakistan
Ordinance XX of 1984, current inconsistencies in the principles of
derogation permit states to accord less protection to the right of free-
dom of religion during ordinary circumstances than during periods of
war or emergency. This Comment has also proposed changes
designed to reduce abusive application of the principles of derogation.
Those changes include defining with more specificity the limitation
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clause provisions of international human rights instruments as well as
conforming the limitation clause provisions to the emergency clause
provisions.
In particular, the limitation clause provision pertaining to the
right to freedom of religion should be amended to ensure greater pro-
tection of freedom of religion as an inalienable community right.
Linda J. Berberian
